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Introduction
India's recent urbanization rate has been formidable, particularly in the Greater Mumbai area where population has increased more than 12 times in the past century to reach 12.5 million in 2011. According to the 2011 Indian census, the slum population of Mumbai was a little over 6.5 million, which accounts for 55-60 percent of the city's population. Despite the work opportunities and the promise of economic and social advancement, men and women who move from villages to megacities must endure the hardship of living in urban slums. Poverty in urban settlements means an insecure residential status, poorly built housing and overcrowding (IIHS, 2011) . In addition, access to basic infrastructure in urban slums (paved roads, water and sanitation, electricity and garbage collection) is far from acceptable and supply can hardly keep up with the growth of the slum population .
In this context, many families opt to pay a neighbor to share a meter, or turn to unlicensed electricians and even local cartels that can provide the service illegally (common forms of stealing electricity include tapping electricity directly from the distribution feeder and tampering with the energy meter). These options can be much cheaper (as they typically charge a flat rate regardless of consumption) 3 and are facilitated by the pervasive informality, lack of law enforcement in slums and difficult interaction between slum residents and the electrical utilities (Depuru et al., 2010; Mimmi and Ecer, 2010; Smith, 2004) . A recent collection of worldwide case studies (Smyser, 2009, p. 5) observes how, because of their poor condition, "Slum consumers have very poor internal wiring, no ground fault protection or circuit breakers, and/or very long and often undersized wires or cables connecting them to the electricity grid", resulting in high risk for electrocution and/or fires.
Policy makers in many rapidly growing megacities of the world face the increasingly urgent challenge of improving access to infrastructures and amenities for slum dwellers (Gamos Ltd., 2005) . Promoting universal access to improved energy has underpinning political motives (slum dwellers may represent a large share of voters) and regulators are increasingly raising social inclusion concerns. The recognized positive effects of improved energy access on general well-being, health, and income generation opportunities (UN Energy, 2008) 4 justify public interventions and subsidies for the provision and regularization of electricity for the urban poor.
From the electricity suppliers' perspective, informal urban settlements represent both an opportunity and a great challenge. On one hand, they would benefit from converting this share of (mostly) informal consumers into regular, paying customers and, at the same time, reduce the high non-technical losses and maintenance costs associated to distribution networks in the proximity of urban slums. On the other hand, utilities are often reluctant to face the tricky governance system and lack of tenure security of slums. In addition, they can be discouraged by the relatively low consumption levels of these consumers (ESMAP, 2011) , since the necessary capital investments may exceed the expected revenues.
international aid agencies, to achieve a holistic understanding of the main drivers of slum dwellers' demand for improved electricity services. Or, to put it differently, what are, in the perspective of slum dwellers, the main barriers to using authorized and safe electricity.
The goal of this paper is to reach a realistic and comprehensive understanding of the reasons that would prompt slum households to obtain an authorized electricity service. The study builds on the assumption that the demand for improved (i.e. legal) electricity, particularly in urban slums, is explained by a multiplicity of factors. While possibly the main barrier, affordability is not the only obstacle that prevents slum dwellers to shift from an informal and sub-standard connection to an authorized electricity connection. Other factors affect the consumers' choice, including settlements informality or transitory status (residents cannot provide the paperwork required by utilities), and the unwritten laws that regulate life and economic choices in slums. As a consequence, even subsidizing connections and/or consumption fees may not be enough to reduce the prevalence of informal connections.
Furthermore, the paper adopts an original approach acknowledging the specificity of the urban slum context, where most households can easily obtain the unauthorized supply of electricity from informal suppliers. Accordingly, the question of interest cannot be framed as predicting the demand for a new product or service, but rather as explaining a potential switch (or upgrade) to a regulated service. For this reason, the electricity demand estimation is framed in comparative terms.
The data, collected in 2011 through an in-depth survey of 3,000 households across four Mumbai slums, are combined with observations based on several field visits and consultations with local counterparts. The survey conducted on households with both regular and informal electricity service allowed observing the prices paid for the unregulated electricity service (which incidentally is not for free). This was a unique opportunity to gain compelling insight into the willingness to pay (WTP), or the value that people attach to electricity, both in terms of the cost for the initial connection as well as the monthly fees for consumption.
More specifically, the study investigated the following: 1) Importance of affordability investigated through both "stated" and "revealed" 6 WTP for (a) hook up and wiring and (b) monthly fee from an authorized supplier. 2) Comparison of the regular, authorized electricity service against the informal connection/provision in terms of consumption volumes, quality, safety and reliability of the service. 3) Qualitative analysis of customers' perceptions and institutional context to gain a realistic appreciation of their attitudes toward regularization policies, the determinants of their choices, and the barriers they face.
The survey verified how the demand for improved electricity in slums is most definitely affected by the price (both paid for the connection investment as well as for the consumption fees), but also by intangible factors that are less measurable but equally influential in either a positive way (e.g., "social inclusion" or safety) or in a negative one (e.g. lack of house ownership status and, possibly, fear of retaliation from the local leaders). Arguably, all of these factors should be pondered by policy makers when tackling the challenging issue of improving access to improved electricity for urban slum dwellers.
Noticeably, while most of the urban slums of Mumbai are electrified, it is often through unauthorized connections (National Sample Survey Office, 2010). These connections not only undermine the quality and safety of the service, but affect all customers by overloading the network and inflating the charges to paying ones.
Many slum rehabilitation programs have been launched in Mumbai over the last sixty years by both the national and the Maharashtra governments to improve housing and infrastructure conditions services for slum dwellers. Unfortunately, very little has been accomplished due to recurrent issues like a general lack of development finance, politics and conflicting regulations.
8 Starting in the 1980s and 1990s, the government has progressively encouraged partnerships with private investors and builders, as well as Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and international organizations. . While representing an important step, that law remains somewhat lacking because it only enforces the delivery of service up to the metering point on the street (and not to the house). In other words, a significant burden remains on the perspective consumers in terms of investment to obtain the connection, as well as safety risks due to substandard wiring.
Sampling and survey design
The data used in this paper were originally collected for a baseline study 11 , sponsored by the Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA), conducted on the pilot project "Improved Electricity Access for Indian Slum Dwellers in Mumbai". The project, conceived and launched by a partnership of multiple international agencies, aimed at testing customized approaches to improve electricity access in slum areas. 12 The pilot project's design involved the adoption of connection subsidies to reduce the households' expenses to acquire an electricity connection and install safe internal wiring. Besides grants from the World Bank and USAID, the local utility Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. (hereafter Reliance) 13 agreed to 7 Access to water and sanitation is highly heterogeneous across the many slums in Mumbai, but the majority of residents rely on shared standpipes for water and community toilets provided by the government (Risbud, 2003) . 8 The reports by IIHS et al. (2011, pp. 53-57) and Risbud (2003, p. 4) offer extensive description of the complex and quite intricate framework regulating Mumbai slums and urban matters. 9 In 1997, the Government of India established a new Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS). According to the SRS, any slum structure existing prior to January 1, 1995 is legalized and protected from eviction. Additionally, every slum dweller whose name appears in the electoral rolls as on January 1, 1995 and who continues to stay in the slum is eligible for rehabilitation. The SRS stated that every residential slum structure eligible for rehabilitation should be provided with an alternative tenement measuring 225 sq. ft., preferably at the same site, and allowed tenants to form cooperative housing societies and appoint a developer for execution of SRS. Developers received incentives in the form of a free 7.5 square feet sale component for every 10 square feet of rehabilitated floor spaces. 10 The Indian Electricity Act of 2003 states that any customer who can provide proof of residency is entitled to a legal electric connection and the local electric utility is obliged to provide such a connection. Some utilities (including Reliance) also request a "no objection" certificate from the municipality or indemnity bond, which states that a legal connection has no implications toward land tenure. 11 The baseline report (Mimmi L. M., 2012) , also written by the author, is available upon request. 12 The project was originally conceived by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) within its Slum Electrification and Loss Reduction (SELR) framework. The pilot was launched in 2010 in cooperation with the International Copper Association (ICA) via its Indian arm, the International Copper Promotion Council India (ICPCI). In 2009, the World Bank's Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA) joined as a donor for the project, supporting a connection subsidy to reduce the end-users contribution for the electricity connection and internal wiring, while allowing the utility to continue recovering its costs. To mobilize the community, USAID partnered with the Slum Rehabilitation Society (SRS), a nonprofit organization founded in 1972 dedicated to the promotion of better housing and living conditions for the slum dwellers of Mumbai. 13 Reliance serves around 200 slum pockets of Mumbai's suburbs. Slums consume 21 percent of Reliance's total sales (Reliance, 2009). carry out upstream investments, 14 and oversee the work of local licensed electricity contractors (LECs) performing the connection work (external wiring from the metering point to the house, as well as internal house wiring). A subsidy payment addressed affordability constraints related to new connections to the house and internal wiring (Table 1 shows the pilot's subsidy plan). Due to various unforeseen issues, the pilot project was later discontinued before completion; nonetheless, the baseline survey remains a valuable and rare source of household-level information on slum dwellers that can inform the design of future slum electrification projects. Source: GPOBA (2008).These figures are based on information provided by Reliance that was subsequently re-estimated by independent technical consultants hired by USAID a The estimates assumed internal wiring to be done according Indian government standards and which meet the basic needs of the residential customer -i.e. 4.5 points (two lights, one fan, one TV, and one spare plug)
In agreement with Reliance, four urban slums serviced by the utility were selected as target areas for the pilot project with a total population of about 42,000 households. The slum "colonies" (as locals call them) differed substantially across dimensions relevant to project eligibility (such as age of settlement, incidence of illegal electricity connections, and income levels), so they were considered as separate subpopulations. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the surveyed slums. 1. Shivaji Nagar, the oldest and largest slum; 2. Indira Nagar (at times considered as a part of Shivaji Nagar); 3. Jai Maharashtra Nagar; 4. Annabhau Sathe Nagar.
The adopted methodology was a two-stage random sampling with stratification, in which each of the four slums represents one stratum. The two-stage approach reduces the costs of physically reaching the interviewees. 15 To pursue a comparative analysis, the sampling design aimed at an equal distribution between households that, at the outset, presented either regular or informal electricity connections. Given the distribution in the sampling universe, disproportionate sampling was required to balance these two groups' representation. Power calculations indicated that surveying 300 households per arm per colony (thus 300 households X 2 connection subgroups X 4 strata = 2,400 total households) would be sufficient to capture an economically and statistically significant difference of 15-20% in WTP (proxied by the cost incurred for obtaining a connection) between legally and illegally electrified households. For the largest colony (Shivaji Nagar), the sample size of the two subgroups was raised to 600 each, not only to reflect the larger size of its population, but also in consideration of the high internal heterogeneity across characteristics such as the settlement dates of its various conglomerates. Finally, the sample size was slightly inflated to account for slums' high expected attrition (loss of participants during the implementation of the project) in view of a potential follow-up survey. Thus, a final sample of 3,000 was identified, including legally and illegally electrified households across the four observed urban slums.
The identification of the sample was done through a rigorous field procedure that included: (a) Premapping of the target slums to divide the area in in 298 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) of about 150 households; (b) Listing of households (to classify them according to residential status, availability of electricity, type of electricity connection, type of wall material, and type of roof material); and (c) Main survey stage.
The in-depth survey of 3,000 households was conducted from August through November 2011. The questionnaire used for the main survey covered: Household demographics and family identifiers; house structure, area, year of construction, commercial activity if any employment, income, assets and expenditure; status of current electricity connection, monthly expenditure and electricity consumption patterns; perceptions about benefits from a regular connection and awareness about safety, reliability, and other issues; 16 stated WTP for installation and internal wiring for legal and safe electricity connection.
In order to qualify for a regular electricity connection provided by Reliance, households needed to meet three conditions: 1. The material used for the house is considered solid enough for the electric meter. Houses were classified as one of three types: pucca, semi-pucca, or kutcha. 17 Only Pucca or semi-pucca houses were eligible for the pilot project because they are more able to safely support the required internal wiring system; 2. Being located in a notified slum, so that eviction is not foreseeable.
18 All target areas were notified.
3. An absent or unauthorized electricity connection;
The balancing of regular and informal connections was obtained at the PSU level through listing by adopting a probability proportional to size (PPS) systematic sampling procedure. 19 The listing team determined whether each the household had electricity and assigned it to one of the following four options:
1 -Bill available and shown; 2 -Bill available but not in the name of the household members; 20 3 -Bill available (in the name of a household member) but not shown; 4 -Bill not available.
Households were classified as having a regular (or authorized) connection if they verified options 1 or 2, and as having an informal (or illegal) connection if they verified item 4. Households verifying item 3 by being unable to show their electric bill were dropped from the sampling frame. 21 Finally a small number of sampled household were found for whom electricity is "altogether unavailable or illegal." Table 2 below illustrates the sample identification process. (3, 874) , nonresponsive (133) or otherwise not suitable for the listing exercise (242) because the availability of electricity connection was unknown. b. The "restricted" dataset from the listing exercise excludes premises for which the availability of electricity connection was unknown at listing stage (overall 4,064). Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of households in the four surveyed slums, highlighting the differences between households according to their formal or informal connection to electricity. Consistent with the paper's overall comparative approach, along with the mean/proportion values of variables, the table reports the statistical tests for differences in means or proportions observed in the two sub-samples of legally and illegally connected households across slums (indicated by the t or z statistics respectively).
Surveyed slum dwellers' living conditions
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20 It is possible that the respondents do not have the electricity bill if the "billing address is different from such premises for supply," this is most likely the case in which the "applicant is not the owner of the premises." 21 A total of 1,633 respondents (5.8% of the listed population with residential status) verified the condition: "3 -Bill Available Did Not Show." 22 For continuous variables, the two-sample test was computed using the Stata routine "svy: mean" followed by "lincom". This test allows to compare the difference in the means from the two groups (legally and illegally In terms of the household composition and demographic information, there were no big differences across slums, nor any remarkable variation between legally and illegally connected households within the same slum. The average number of household members was consistently four to five. The average age for the head of the household was slightly higher (41 years old) in households with an authorized connection than those with an informal connection (39 years old). On average, the household head had completed primary education. Table 3 also shows how the prevalent occupation of the head of the household tends to vary across slums, although differences are not always statistically significant. Shivaji Nagar and Jay Maharashtra Nagar showed the highest differences (both practically and statistically significant) in employment between their respective formal and informal subgroups. For instance, in Jay Maharashtra Nagar, the heads of legally connected houses were mostly employed (55 percent), casual laborers (29 percent), and self-employed (9 percent), whereas their peers in informally connected households were mostly casual laborers (53 percent), employed (30 percent), and self-employed (7 percent). This different distribution could confirm an unsurprising correlation between the illegal electricity connection status and unstable employment.
Another aspect illustrated in Table 3 is the extent of comparability across and within slums in terms of housing. The answers confirmed that Annabhau Sathe Nagar and Jay Maharasthra Nagar were "newer" settlements, with the majority of sampled houses built after 1995 (60-74 percent across slums and connection status). Shivaji Nagar and Indira Nagar are older, with only 43-61 percent of the houses built post-1995. Whereas authorized electrical connection status is almost always associated with earlier housing construction, Indira Nagar shows the opposite (43 percent of "legal" houses are post-1995 vs. 60 percent of "illegal" ones). As for the year when the surveyed residents moved in their current house, the answers were quite similar: Most respondents had been in the same structure since the late 1990s or early 2000s. Households with legal electricity status had moved in 2-4 years earlier than their informally connected peers, except for Jay Maharashtra Nagar where both subgroups had been residing in the same house since 2001. Across slums, very few respondents indicated that their houses were used for running a business, showing highly similar incidence in legally connected households (5 percent) and informally connected ones (2 percent).
Lastly, table 3 reports the distribution of the sample, across slums and by connection status, in terms of the housing construction material. Having a solid house (pucca or semi-pucca) was an important prerequisite for obtaining a regular meter. The regularly connected households show an overall prevalence of semi-pucca houses (80 percent), with 14 percent pucca houses, and only 6 percent of the more precarious kutcha houses. Looking at the informally connected group, the distribution by type of construction is very different, in both real and statistical terms. While the semi-pucca type still prevails (67 percent), the second most prevalent type is kutcha (29 percent), and only 4 percent have a pucca house. As expected, the illegal connections were correlated with the more precarious type of house, possibly due to a more recent settlements and/or a lower socioeconomic condition. Also expected, housing types disaggregated by slum display sharp variations. For instance, the legally connected subgroup of Shivaji Nagar (the oldest and largest settlements) had the highest prevalence of pucca houses (23 percent), whereas the informally connected households in Jay Maharashtra displayed the highest incidence of kutcha houses (51 percent). Notably Jay Maharashtra's respondents moved to the slum at later dates. Source: Estimates from survey for the project "Mumbai -Improved Electricity Access for Indian Slum Dwellers." t-statistic and z-statistic values show the tests for differences in means/proportions between the legally and illegally connected households across slums. ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: Estimates from survey for the project "Mumbai -Improved Electricity Access for Indian Slum Dwellers." t-statistic and z-statistic values show the tests for differences in means/proportions between the legally and illegally connected households across slums. ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Surveyed slum dwellers' income and expenditure
The survey investigated household well-being both in terms of earned income and an estimate of expenditures on major commodities and services. Table 4 shows reported household monthly income disaggregated by major income brackets. None of the sampled households declared a monthly income lower than Rs 2,000. In the entire sample, the majority of households -50-60 percent -earned Rs 5,000-10,000 monthly, or Rs 1,250-2,500 per capita given an average household size of four. To put these figures in perspective, the September 2011 poverty line for urban areas identified by the Indian Planning Commission was Rs 965 per capita per month (around Rs 32 per day). 23 Within each slum, the disparity of household income levels between legally and informally connected households is quite sharp (with high statistical significance levels), especially in the more extreme brackets, confirming an intuitive positive correlation between higher income and legal electrical connections. Income levels also vary across slums: in Shivaji Nagar/Indira Nagar, 30-40 percent of households earn more than Rs 10,000; in Jay Maharashtra Nagar, 21 percent; and in Annabhau Sathe Nagar, only 14 percent. The survey included a module about monthly consumption data, which tends to be the most commonly used metric to measure welfare in developing countries. 24 This module covered: (1) day-to-day expenditure on food and nonfood items (e.g., items ranging from soap to household furnishings and transportation); (2) rent and /or house loan repayment (if applicable); (3) other spending (e.g., education, clothing); and (4) spending on electricity consumption. Table 5 , displays these categories of consumption for the regularly and informally connected households in each slum.
As it commonly happens in household-level surveys, within the bundle of goods and services consumed by individuals, housing can be unreliably reported, particularly by home-owners. Whereas rent offers an expenditure item expressing the welfare derived by housing, there is no such indicator for homeowners 23 Based on September 2011 exchange rate, this would be US$ 0.67, which indicates the definition of poverty adopted by Indian government is much stricter than the common US$1-2 per day per capita. 24 Measures of earned income are reliable in developed countries, where income comes from a few (traceable) sources with low annual variation. Consumption measures are more suitable to developing countries, where income sources are more uncertain and volatile with higher prevalence of agriculture, self-employment, informality, and casual labor (Deaton and Zaidi, 1999) . The Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS), established by the Development Research Group (DECRG) of the World Bank, has significantly improved the type and quality of household data collected in developing countries. without loans. 25 In this sample, the vast majority of households (2,320 out of 3,000) owned their dwelling, but only a small share (58 households) declared an outstanding loan on the house, which made accounting for this item particularly problematic. To address this likely measurement error, for homeowners who reported no monthly loan payment, a hedonic pricing model, 26 was used to predict an "imputed" rental value (following the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) practice). Source: Estimates from survey for the project "Mumbai -Improved Electricity Access for Indian Slum Dwellers." t-statistic values show the tests for differences in means between the legally and illegally connected households across slums. ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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A key goal of the study was to get a credible comparison of energy demand (expressed in kWh consumed per month) between households that are legally and informally connected. Table 5 interestingly illustrates that the average percent of the monthly income spent on electricity (as recalled by the interviewees) was 6.35 percent for legally connected households, and only 3.5 percent for informally connected ones. Arguably, the data presented a reporting bias similar to the housing expenditure. In fact, for legally connected household, the survey relied on the quantity of consumed electricity per month available from the latest electricity bill. 28 Clearly though, such information was impossible to obtain for the subsample of households with unauthorized or shared connections. Thus, similar to the rent-equivalent estimation, the observed subsample with meter readings was used to estimate a hedonic regression demand model for monthly electricity consumption for the unmetered households. The method, widely adopted in microeconomics, allows decomposing the estimated demand (kWh per month) into its constituent factors, such as the household demographics, the availability and quantity of electrical appliances, and other area-25 See Chandrasekhar and Montgomery (2010) for an informative discussion about the official statistical estimation of the poverty line in India and how it could be improved by accounting for housing needs. 26 Based on seminal contributions by Rosen (1974) and Epple (1987) , the method has been widely adopted, especially in environmental and housing applications. 27 See Appendix B, table B1 for details on the how the rent-equivalent value for house owners was estimated. 28 In 1,295 cases out of 1,590 Reliance customers, enumerator got an actual valid reading, meaning the household receives the bill in the same premise and was able and willing to show the latest bill. specific qualifiers of the electricity service.
29 Following Abeyasekera and Ward (2002) , the resulting function was used to predict the volume of energy consumed in the entire sample, based on the characteristics captured by the covariates. Based on the resulting summary statistics and goodness of fit tests, the predicted value (80.86 kWh/month vs. the observed 77.2 kWh/month on average) seemed to replace with reasonable accuracy the actual metered reading from the latest bill. Table 6 shows the average electricity consumed according to the type of connection provider, as well as the corresponding monthly expenditure. Interestingly, there is not much difference in the average metered/imputed monthly consumption volume (kWh/month), regardless of who provided the connection. All the mean values are between 70 and 80kWh/month. Conversely, the difference in the average monthly expenditure is remarkable, depending on who provides the connection. These aggregate figures (further analyzed later) suggest a significantly higher charge for legally connected households for a similar volume of electricity. 3 Methods to estimate slum dwellers' willingness to pay for improved electricity A fundamental building block to understanding and predicting the demand for legal electricity is the willingness to pay (WTP) of slum dwellers, that is how much they are willing to pay, given a certain price and their own wealth constraints. In several slum electrification pilot schemes (such as USAID-backed SELR ones), subsidies (usually one-off subsidies to decrease the capital cost of the initial connection to the electrical grid) have been justified to improve poor people's access to basic infrastructure services.
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In literature and similar case-studies, various methods are discussed to estimate the WTP for a new (or improved) service 31 . One recurrent method is to elicit a "stated preference," through contingent valuation (CV) or simply asking "How much would you pay for good/service 'x'?" However, stated preference methods can misconstrue the estimation of the WTP because answers may not reflect actual behavior.
32
29 See Appendix B, table B2, for details on the how the how the energy demand (kWh consumed per month) was estimated for households with informal or shared connections. 30 See USAID (2004) . 31 See, among others, the systematic review by the 3IE initiative . 32 Issues found with the "stated preference" method involve unsophisticated sampling, lack of complete information on prices, and reluctance to reveal preferences for various reasons.
The case at hand presented a unique opportunity to estimate the WTP through a "revealed preference" model, given the situation of slums where the alternative to a regular connection (unauthorized one) is also observable. The basic assumption is that the actual prices paid for informal/unauthorized service offer compelling insight into the value that people attach to electricity, both in terms of the fee for the initial connection as well as fees for monthly consumption. Such "revealed" WTP (what people are paying for a comparable alternative) seems more stringent and realistic than a "stated" WTP (what people declare they would pay for a better alternative). This could be a better way to assess the affordability gap between an illegal connection and a legal one. Evidently, using the expenditure for unauthorized service as a proxy for WTP implies a normal functioning market, an assumption which cannot be invoked in the context of slums, but some mitigation strategies can be adopted.
Increasing comparability of WTP estimates: a propensity score matching approach
To exploit the observable costs sustained by informally connected households, it is critical to ensure some degree of comparability between the two groups of respondents with regular and unauthorized connections.
Despite earlier efforts to balance the sample through the survey design, the two groups could still exhibit discrepancies on a number of characteristics, potentially causing estimation errors if correlated to (or responsible for) the household's existing connection status. For instance, the extra-premium paid for a legal connection might reflect higher income levels; better social inclusion, status, etc. (possibly with simultaneity of causation from income level to connection type and vice versa). Also, as commonly observed, slum dwellers start investing in their homes after living for some time in the community. Thus, if more of those with irregular connections are newcomers, the differences in WTP outcomes might get overestimated. Additionally, there is some uncertainty about the comparability (in terms of quality and safety) of the electrical equipment and materials used for internal wiring by authorized and illegal providers; the questionnaire could not capture these aspects.
For all the above reasons, a simple comparison of regularly and informally connected households would have been risky and misleading due to likely nonrandom differences between the two groups. In order to tackle this risk (i.e. the 'selection bias'), a propensity score matching (PSM) approach was applied to restrict the comparison only to households with high likelihood of switching from an informal service to an authorized one (see Appendix C for detailed explanation of the PSM method used in the study).
PSM is an increasingly popular technique used in quasi-experimental evaluations, especially when random assignment to a program is not an option (due to the voluntary participation or other contextual constraints of the project design). 33 This technique relies on the propensity score, an index that synthetically captures the individual's probability of receiving a "treatment", in this case obtaining a regular connection. Formally:
Where: Di  (0, 1) = 'Treatment'  "Having a regular electricity connection" (2) X = Vector of households observable characteristics
The propensity score is built on a set of variables selected based on their likely correlation with both participating in a slum electrification program, as well as with the WTP outcomes of interest. Conditional on some assumptions (illustrated in Appendix C), the individual propensity to be in the "authorized connection status" can be used to select a set of informal households that is "matched" (i.e. more credibly comparable) to connected households such that two balanced, and thereby equivalent, groups are constructed. In this way, PSM isolates two subgroups of households that allow to study the outcomes of interest (WTP in this case). Figure 1 offers a synthetic review of all the strategies adopted in the study to estimate the willingness to pay for legal, improved electricity services. 
Limitations of the estimation of WTP for regular electricity
It must be acknowledged that the propensity score matching process ensures a balanced distribution across "observed" characteristics (used to estimate the propensity score), but it may miss significant differences in "unobserved" characteristics of the sample. Acknowledging this potential limitation of the "measurable" WTP outcomes, the survey also covered other intangible, contextual factors that might affect the decision to shift to legal and safe connections. Another possible limitation in the approach is that it only relies on a cross-sectional survey. Thus, the effect of switching to a regular/legal connection on a household's future electricity demand is difficult to predict (Will it trigger higher usage? To what extent will the family benefit from consumption cross-subsidies?). To study consumption patterns and convincingly predict a demand curve, more information would be needed on the dynamic changes in tariffs and the expected income and substitution effects this might have on consumers.
Results
As illustrated by aggregate figures in Table 6 , self-reported electricity expenditure per month showed remarkable differences between households connected through an authorized provider and those hooked informally to electricity (respectively Rs 555 and only Rs 257), surprisingly associated to very similar average consumption volumes. Yet it can be argued that, in aggregate terms, these average monthly expenditures may be inaccurate because they encompass all consumption levels. In addition, while it is uncertain how the informal fees are linked to consumption volumes 34 , regulated tariffs are linked to both volumes and income status, with discounts for holders of below poverty line (BPL). Thus, as described below, households were segmented in brackets of consumption volumes for better comparability.
WTP for monthly electricity consumption
A test on comparative monthly expenditures is provided by the propensity score matching, which was computed using the stratified matching comparison procedure. 35 For additional comparability, only the 74 percent of households who consumed less than 100 KWh/month were considered. Following Bensh et al. (2011) , a stratification method was adopted that selected only households that exhibited a propensity score higher than 0.5. These subjects were assumed to be more prone to switch and, therefore, constituted a restricted informal group that provided a closer match to the comparable observed legal group. Table 7a shows for matched sample groups the mean differential WTP figures together with their Lin. Std. errors and t test statistic on the difference. For comparison, the results obtained from the unmatched samples (i.e. the whole surveyed population before matching) are reported in Table 7b .
Looking at the monthly charge, the group most "likely to switch to legality" (with propensity score higher than 0.5) shows a larger average difference (Rs 319) between it and the matching regular group, than is seen between unmatched sample and the legal group (where the difference is Rs 192.8). This increase is somewhat unexpected, but this figure corroborates the perception that the fee for monthly consumption indeed constitutes an important obstacle to legality. Notably, some slum electrification schemes may assume the monthly charge to be a nonissue for slum dwellers, especially those on a lifeline-level consumption status. In contrast, the survey results suggest that the differences (even accounting for tariff cross subsidy) are hardly negligible, especially for poor households.
WTP for improved electricity connection
Another important WTP aspect was the slum dwellers' likelihood to pay to obtain an improved and regular electricity connection, i.e. the one-off investment required for a standard meter and internal wiring. Computing the average for the four slums, the self-reported expenditure for a regular connection obtained from Reliance was Rs 2,487, whereas households with illegal connections reported paying on average only Rs 950. 36 It is important to acknowledge that the rate of response on connection costs was very different across types of connection supplier: whereas 84 percent of the Reliance customers reported a similar connection cost, only 26 percent of those who obtained electricity via other unauthorized ways did. It is unclear how much of this difference in response rates might be attributed to a measurement error or systematic underreporting: Perhaps a big payment to a utility is easier to recall, or the unreported cases could include the worst cases of theft or meter tampering. Regardless, it seems safe to argue that, for an informal connection with decent meter and functionality, some fee is generally paid to an informal provider, who charges significantly less than Reliance.
Self-reported figures confirmed a remarkable difference in the average internal wiring expenditure as well, which is on average Rs 1,848 for a legal connection, and Rs 951 for an informal one across all slums. Unlike the meter installation cost, the rate of response on the questions on wiring was more consistent and 34 According to the local project stakeholders, informal suppliers charge a monthly tariff that is proportionate to the number of electrical points in the dwelling. 35 One of various matching algorithms that can be used to determine the matched sub-samples based on the propensity score (see Appendix C for details). The propensity score matching was also computed using the other procedures which showed consistent results (estimates available from the author). 36 Observations corresponding to consumption greater than 500 kWh per month have been dropped. the survey suggests that there is generally a charge for internal wiring no matter what the type of connection. In fact, the charge is reported in 88 percent of the "regular" connections and in 74 percent of the "unauthorized" connections. The alternative "unauthorized" methods are consistently 50-60 percent of the average cost of a "regular" connection.
Again, PSM offered a way to test to assess the reliability of self-reported WTP directly asked in the household survey. Table 7a reports the estimates obtained via stratified matching (households with a propensity score higher than 0.5) on the difference in the means of WTP for connection and internal wiring. For comparative purposes, the results of the unadjusted analysis are also reported in table 7b. When using stratified matching, the regular vs. informal difference in connection fee decreases from Rs 1,550.3 to Rs 1,446.9. For the internal wiring costs, the regular vs. informal difference decreases from Rs 789.5 to Rs 746.5. This is consistent with the hypothesis that disregarding the selection-into-treatment bias, the WTP outcome could overestimate the difference between regular and informal costs. In other words, matching is doing its work; it identifies sub-samples that show higher resemblance. 
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Source: Estimates from survey for the project "Mumbai -Improved Electricity Access for Indian Slum Dwellers." All households in both samples use less than 100 kWh of electricity per month, including only observations for which connection expenditures (both meter fee and internal wiring) were known. Table 7 .a shows results after matching on propensity score (stratification method) was obtained restricting observations to those with propensity score > 0.5.
Overall, though slightly lower, the "revealed" WTP preferences validated through matching confirm the initial findings on connection costs as the simple "stated" WTP estimates: Indeed substantial differences in costs suggest the initial investment for an authorized meter may be an issue for households. In addition, they bring about a very strong confirmation that the monthly consumption charge (when switching to a regulated electricity connection) poses a serious affordability issue for the target households, and as such should probably be considered by policy makers intervening in slum electricity regularization.
Households' perspective on switching to improved electricity
The study also acknowledged intangible factors that may constraint slum dwellers' access to improved electricity. In fact, urban slums are, by definition, atypical markets where suppliers deal with theft and low collection rates, while consumers are prevented from accessing the optimal type of service by many contextual barriers, such as informality and social exclusion, lack of property title for their house, and possible information asymmetries.
The survey asked respondents to identify the "barriers" that prevented them from having a regular connection. Responses were solicited from 1,421 households (47 percent of the sample), that is, those who had: (1) a shared meter not from a landlord; (2) a shared a meter from a landlord; (3) an unauthorized connection; or (4) no electricity connection. The question allowed for multiple answers. The main constraints identified by respondents were: 1. "The monthly payment for (informal) electricity consumption is less than the one with the regulated connection," according to 32.2 percent of respondents, 2. "The cost of the (legal) connection is too high," according to 29.44 percent of respondents, 3. "The connection has been provided by the landlord," according to 14.01 percent of respondents, 4. The household "had applied earlier for a legal connection, but could not get it," according to 8.87 percent of respondents, 5. The household "lacks proper address proof," according to 7.23 percent of respondents, 6. The household "cannot get a legal connection, since the dwelling structure is illegal," according to 6.44 percent of respondents.
The responses corroborate once again the importance of considering future consumption costs when designing slum electrification programs. Reason 3 raises an important consideration in terms of the actual ability of the intended beneficiaries of the pilot program to make the decision to enroll in the scheme. In fact, in 14 percent of the eligible households, customers cannot choose to switch to an authorized supplier of electricity, but rather depend on the landlord's choice. For policy makers, it is of utter importance to address all the parties that are involved in the decision to participate in a program -in the specific case both tenants and landlords should have been included when promoting the regularization of electricity supply.
Overall, the survey consistently reinforces the insight that the slums' unofficial governance system might be more influential than a superficial observation would detect. Whereas it might be speculative to assess a household's actual level of freedom in the choice of its infrastructure supplier, it is documented through the survey that 72 percent of the illegal households got their electricity connection from a "local person" (arguably some influential local leader or "slum lord"). In Indian urban slums, local political and community leaders are regarded as key figures for the communities and could potentially employ some form of sanction. As a matter of fact, during the field work, the local survey team reported incidents in which they encountered hostility when they first entered the communities. This stresses the importance of recognizing the informal interactions at play and identifying those local leaders who can influence the decision to switch to legal infrastructure services and gain their trust.
Further, 30 percent of the 1,421 illegal eligible households declared that they had tried in the past to obtain a regular connection. When asked why they could not get the connection, the respondents gave the following reasons (multiple answers were allowed): 1. The service provider (Reliance) refused the electricity connection (37 percent of requests), 2. The illegal/ unauthorized electricity connection installation was cheaper than the legal one (28 percent of requests), 3. The household did not have the required documentation (20 percent of requests), 4. The illegal monthly charge was cheaper (13 percent of requests).
These answers document that, at least in principle, a fair share of slum residents would prefer to switch to the authorized service. Combined with the affordability issue (both of connection and consumption), housing's vulnerability, as well as the applicants' lack of awareness and/or compliance with the required documentation, are all potential constraints to regular access to electricity.
On a positive note, 79 percent of eligible households (1,421) declared they wanted a legal connection and 75 percent (or 95 percent of those who want a legal connection) stated they also wanted improved internal wiring, which, they saw as safer and more durable. For the few respondents who would skip the improved internal wiring, the main reason was that they "already have good wiring in the dwelling" (73 percent of those who said no). Among the reasons that would push them to switch to regular connections, respondents included "getting a better service" (52 percent) and "a continuous supply" (46 percent). To understand respondents' idea of "better service", it is helpful to look at their responses to questions about what issues they experienced with illegal connections. Among informally connected households across the slums, 76 percent enjoyed electricity all day, while a significant (although varying across slums) share has experienced frequent power interruptions (29 percent in Annabhau Sathe Nagar, 26 percent in Jay Maharashtra Nagar, 15 percent in Indira Nagar and 7 percent in Shivaji Nagar). Additionally, 11-17 percent of the informally connected subsample across slums reported in the past year an incident such as short circuits, electrical shock due to defects or malfunctions in wiring or electrical appliances, or electricity fluctuation. Intermittent supply of electricity also affects regular customers.
Lastly, respondents commented that the main issues faced when electricity is unavailable are increased mosquitoes (32 percent) and poor ventilation (10 percent). Health issues were not thoroughly investigated in the survey, although access to electricity for cooking (fewer indoor pollutants than kerosene) and better ventilation and less exposure to mosquitoes indeed may improve health. The survey briefly assessed the incidence of major illnesses: 24 percent of respondents reported cases of (mosquitoborne) malaria in the family over the past year, followed by 7 percent reporting typhoid.
Conclusions
A major issue in designing slum upgrading interventions is the serious lack of available data on slum population. Even though recent census rounds in India have started including slum dwellers, records are still scattered and often exclude the most precarious or recent settlements -the actual target of urban development policies. The discussed survey compiled a complete census of four diverse Mumbai slums with a total population of 42,000 households, 3,000 of which were surveyed after a rigorous statistical sampling process. The adopted methodology is an interesting example of how the specificity of the urban slum context can dictate the modality to collect evidence. Unlike rural or remote off-grid consumers, most of the urban ones are in fact connected to electricity, although through unauthorized, sub-standard connections. The study exploited this fact framing the investigated questions as a comparison to appreciate the differences between the informally connected customers against their peers who already enjoy regular and safe electricity.
In the survey sample, informally connected households received their connections through: (a) "local person", i.e. an influential community leader or business person, (75 percent); (b) neighbors (19 percent); (c) other, unspecified provider (2 percent). Although the electricity demand is fairly homogeneous in volume (ranging between 70 and 80 kWh per month), the prevalent "local person" provider charges about half the Reliance tariff and roughly 10 percent less than the "neighbor" providers. In terms of living conditions, informally connected households have consistently moved in 2-4 years later than their legally connected peers and are systematically found in more precarious types of premises.
Consistent with initial assumptions, this work confirmed that affordability -both of the initial electrical hook up and the monthly fees-is a major impediment to shifting to legal connections. Obtaining unauthorized connections costs one half to one third as much as legal connections, while the average monthly consumption charge is bound to double with regularization. The latter is also cited by the survey respondents themselves as the number one obstacle to regularization. Such important price differentials are confirmed when restricting the observation to highly comparable households (identified through propensity score matching) in the same volume bracket. A caveat remains, though, because, even after matching, the difference in revealed price preference might still hide some intangible factors at play when seeking regularization. Nevertheless, a key insight from this work is that consumption subsidies should be considered in a slum electrification scheme, even if just as a transitional measure.
Beyond affordability, the survey shed light on some other barriers faced by eligible households in the sample, such as prior refusal of the utility or lack of appropriate documentation. Informal consumers also disclosed the benefits they foresee if they could switch to regular connections, including increased safety and service reliability. Notably, they greatly value the unintended benefit of receiving a monthly utility bill, which represents a proof of residency that can serve for securing credit or other financial services. Lastly, the household-level survey and consultations with local stakeholders uncovered some constraints to regularization that, while hard to measure, are just as important to design effective slum electrification schemes. Careful consideration should be given to the following:
 The interests of community and business leaders who, in the context of informality and weak rule of law, manage (and profit from) the supply of basic services.  The limited decision making power of the intended beneficiary of the electricity regularization:
Other agents (like landlords) may be influential in the supplier choice.  The institutional backgrounds and past attempts of slum rehabilitation programs, with their legacy of skepticism generated by a history of policy failures.  (Hence) the need for successful demonstration pilots to overcome the understandable distrust of slum dwellers toward new slum upgrading programs.  The engagement of local CBOs and NGOs, as well as active social marketing and promotional efforts are crucial to winning community support for a project and enabling its success.
Further investigating the relations and potential overlap between landlords and unauthorized suppliers of electricity would be an interesting topic for additional research. Who are these land owners and local leaders and how would they respond to systematic regularization interventions? This study was based on a single cross-sectional household survey, but understanding the effect of a subsidized electricity regularization intervention would entail observing the dynamic response of beneficiaries to the improved electricity service and changing tariffs. Thus, estimating electricity consumption patterns and how slum dwellers respond to regularized electricity supply (or varying subsidy levels) is another intriguing and nontrivial topic for further investigation, which could be addressed through longitudinal studies. This paper builds on a baseline evaluation report prepared by the author on behalf of the Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA), which provided financial support for the data collection as part of an evaluation of the slum electrification pilot project "Improved Electricity Access for Indian Slum Dwellers in Mumbai". Indira Nagar, situated in Mankhurd Mandala, and earlier known as Matang Rushi Nagar, began in 1982 and developed from 1985 to 1990. It is divided into five areas: Old Matang Rushi Nagar, Indira Nagar, Shivneri Nagar, Ekta Naga, and Janata Nagar. The slum has a substantial north Indian population who work as hawkers in the city. Other major livelihoods are daily labor and selling scrap items.
Annabhau Sathe Nagar started in 1982 and developed in a phased manner. The slum now has two distinguishable areas based on time of settlement. The area settled before 1995 has about 20 lines of chawls with 70-80 households in each and the area settled after 1995, called Chikhalwadi, has 16 lines of chawls with 150 households each. In this slum, construction workers and daily wage earners form a substantial population.
Jai Maharashtra Nagar, is definitely the "newer" colony among those included in the study. While the slum settlement first developed during the period 1985-90, the majority of houses was built after 1995.
APPENDIX B
Hedonic estimation of rent-equivalent housing expenditure for homeowners not disclosing loan information For the subsample of household that rents, the known rent was regressed on a common set of explanatory dwelling features, demographic, and location variables. The parameter estimates was then used to predict a "rent-equivalent" value that owner-occupiers would be paying if they were renting. Based on the resulting summary statistics and goodness of fit tests, the predicted rent-equivalent value seemed reasonably accurate. Hedonic estimation of predicted electricity consumption for unauthorized users To estimate the energy demand (kWh consumed per month) for households with informal or shared connections, the assumption was that a household's demand for a particular energy source depends on factors including: (1) the characteristics of the household, (2) the availability and price of alternate energy sources, and (3) location of the community, which can influence energy demand 
APPENDIX C Propensity score matching methodology
Propensity score matching (PSM) is used in this study for a "cross-sectional matching" between households with and without regular electricity based on observed pre-intervention characteristics. The peculiarity of this case is that, instead of a post-program assessment, a pre-program survey is used whereas the sample group with legal electricity connections offers a hypothetical "post-program representation" of the program beneficiaries. PSM requires two conditions: 
Propensity score computation
If these assumptions are verified, the propensity score is computed as the probability of assignment to the treatment, Pr(D) that comes from a binary probit or logit regression.
Then, based on the propensity score the outcomes of participating and nonparticipating households with similar propensity scores are compared to obtain the 'treatment effect'. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) will be:
where the "counterfactual" can be generally defined as:
although in this particular case the unknown scenario is:
(C.8) 37 In the typical post-program dataset, the missing Y 0 distribution for program participants (counterfactual) can be substituted with the observed Y 0 distribution for the matched nonparticipant group (Y 0 |D = 0). 38 As in a few other ex-ante applications, all the "factual", or observed, outcomes (Y 1 |D = 1) are actually about "control" households-illegal households who have not yet received the program-while the unknown (i.e. not observed) is the "pre-program" status of regular customers (Y 1 |D = 0).
Matching Participants to Nonparticipants
Different matching criteria can be used to assign participants to non-participants on the basis of the propensity score.  Nearest-neighbor matching, where each treatment unit is matched to the comparison unit (or n nearest neighbors) with the closest propensity score.  Caliper or radius matching, that involves matching with replacement, only among propensity scores within a certain range  Stratification or interval matching, which partitions the common support into different strata (or intervals) and calculates the program's impact within each interval.  Kernel and local linear matching that use nonparametric matching estimators that use a weighted average of all nonparticipants to construct the counterfactual match for each participant.
These methods can gauge slightly different results, but all are equally acceptable. The evaluator typically selects the more appropriate procedure according to the dataset specific characteristics (see methodological guidance in the handbook by ). This paper only reports the estimates obtained with the stratification method, but also the nearest-neighbor matching and kernel methods were used for comparison reasons. The results are reported on the extended baseline study (Mimmi L. M., 2012) available from the author.
Propensity score specification model in the study The probability of adopting an improved connection with Reliance (propensity score) was estimated for both legal and informal subsamples. Consistent with the PSM assumptions, the literature emphasizes that model specification improves when certain criteria are met:
 A rich set of data is available from which to choose observed covariates;  Variables included are either time invariant or nonresponsive to the treatment (participation in the program);  The treatment and comparison groups are sampled using the same instruments and the measures are similarly constructed;  The treatment and comparison groups come from similar geographic areas.
A sensible criterion in the choice of the independent variables for the specification of the model is to include the explicit criteria for the program's eligibility, such as, for example, having the house built with solid construction material. Similarly, it is important to include factors that could be responsible for selfselection (for instance, the housing variables are relatively inelastic wealth indicators). In addition, years of education for the head of the household, occupation as a casual laborer, holding a ration card, and inclusion on election rolls reflect self-selection due to information asymmetries or entitlement to social welfare schemes. The size of the building captures the lighting demand at the time of the connection, whereas the year of construction and time since the family settled discriminate recent settlers and tell about living stability. A critical factor linked to the likelihood of investing in better infrastructure.
The variables included in the model (Table C.1) reflect the above considerations. Table C.1 depicts the results of the estimated logit model to obtain the propensity score, indicated by a binary dependent variable that equals 1 for having a regular electricity connection from Reliance ("treatment"). Most variables have statistically significant coefficients at the 1 percent level and the model fit reflected by the Pseudo R Squared is acceptable at 0.20. Looking at the marginal effects signs (second column in Table C.1) , 39 it appears that, overall, the longer the family has been living in its premise, the higher the probability of having a connection with Reliance.
In line with expectations, having the house built with the more solid material (pucca material) is a predictor of the legal status, while the more precarious construction (kutcha material) is negatively correlated. In terms of location, location in Indira Nagar increases the probability of illegal status. Not surprisingly, the impacts of the household head's being a woman or a casual laborer correlate negatively with having a legal connection. Having a bank account or a ration card are positively associated with a legal connection. Overall, these findings validate the emphasis that many recent slum electrification programs put on the repercussions of social exclusion and sense of abandonment as incentive to illegality. Source: Estimates from survey for the project "Mumbai -Improved Electricity Access for Indian Slum Dwellers." Note: a. Categorical variable for "slum" is expanded into a set of indicator (dummy) variables, dropping the dummy corresponding to Shivaji Nagar. b. Categorical variable for "own status" is expanded into a set of indicator (dummy) variables, dropping the dummy corresponding to "own house." c. Categorical variable for "material of construction" is expanded into a set of indicator (dummy) variables, dropping the dummy corresponding to "semi-pucca."
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Robustness check
According to the first assumption of the method, there should be no unobserved factors affecting participation in the program. Typically, there are unobserved factors that are not balanced between the treatment and control households, which could bias the results. 41 The rather low pseudo R squared (0.20) in the propensity score model (Table C .1) corroborates this potential concernThe second assumption of "overlap" (Assumption 2) was verified inspecting the distribution of the propensity score in both treatment groups. While the differences in the density across the groups reflected the higher homogeneity (in terms of the propensity score variables) for the legally connected group vis-à-vis a more dispersed distribution of the illegally connected group, a sufficient overlap was found, especially in the stratum were the eligible households are more likely to participate in the program (i.e. where the propensity score is greater than 0.5).
Lastly, after identifying matched subsample based on the propensity score, the comparability between the two matched groups was analyzed by looking at the difference in means of the covariates between the connected and the likely-to-connect households. (The analysis is further restricted to households consuming no more than 100 kWh/month, which includes the vast majority of the sample). As can be seen in Table C .2, while the unmatched initial sample shows some serious imbalance in most of the covariates of interest (i.e. rental status of the house, materials used for house construction, education level of the household head, proportion of households with bank account), the matched sample shows a better balancing of these covariates between the legal and illegal groups. Household has bank account 0.2115055 11.4683*** -0.01815 -13.52
Household has ration card 0.1727 11.2928*** 0.04291 -8.11
The household is included in election rolls 0.1870705 11.8269*** 0.0264 -10.72
The woman in the household works -0.0527403 3.6211*** 0.01402 4.67
The head of household is employed as a casual laborer -0.1413817 7.3116*** 0.02393 8.72 Source: Estimates from survey for the project "Mumbai -Improved Electricity Access for Indian Slum Dwellers." *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.001 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. Values are standardized % differences. a. Categorical variable for "slum" is expanded into a set of indicator (dummy) variables -dropping the dummy corresponding to Shivaji Nagar. b. Categorical variable for "own status" is expanded into a set of indicator (dummy) variables -dropping the dummy corresponding to "Own house". c. Categorical variable for "material of construction" is expanded into a set of indicator (dummy) variables -dropping the dummy corresponding to "semi-pucca." Even if sometimes the sign changed, in all cases the practical difference is reduced.
